The Limits of Energy Independence

Apr 23, 2020 | Economist
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Even when American policy in the Middle East has been about more than oil, it has been about oil. That has sometimes been jarringly obvious, as when Dwight Eisenhower justified his decision to send troops to the region in 1958 on the basis that it was the “birthplace of three great religions”, as well as having “two-thirds of the presently known oil deposits”. At other times the oiliness of America’s policy has been more subtle, or partial. George W. Bush invaded Iraq in 2003 for several reasons: to secure its weapons of mass destruction, to spread democracy, and, his would-be successor John McCain acknowledged, to guarantee America’s oil supply. Donald Trump’s commitment to reducing America’s involvement in the Middle East also relates to the black stuff. It is justified in part by the shale-oil revolution that has made America the world’s biggest producer, lessening its dependence on the region. The administration’s effort to promote Saudi Arabia as a regional proxy, to help effect its withdrawal, is also somehow oleaginous. The president’s Middle East consigliere, Jared Kushner, sees the country’s crown prince, Mohammad bin Salman, as an oil-important ally against Iran and potential ally for Israel. Mr Trump views the Saudis as oil-rich buyers of American arms and property. Both oil-related struts of his Middle East policy looked shaky even before the meltdown in oil markets that began last month. A spike in the oil price in September, after a drone strike on a Saudi installation, was a reminder that America is still at the mercy of the global oil market and therefore Middle Eastern instability. The Saudis have proved to be an embarrassing proxy. They have additionally failed to make good on almost any of the arms deals the president trumpeted. And the more he has pushed the bilateral relationship, the more politically toxic it has become.