The Helmand Food Report: The Illusion of Success
Publisher: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit
Author(s): David Mansfield and Matthew Longmore
Date: 2019
Topics: Climate Change, Governance, Renewable Resources
Countries: Afghanistan
According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime’s (UNODC) estimates, opium poppy cultivation in the province of Helmand in southern Afghanistan dropped dramatically during the first year of the Helmand Food Zone (HFZ), falling by 37 percent – from an estimated 103,590 hectares in 2008 to 69,833 hectares in 2009. In 2010, the amount of opium poppy cultivated fell again – this time only slightly – and remained at around 65,000 hectares. This achievement came at a time when there were few good news stories in counternarcotics and amidst a politically charged policy making environment where there were growing demands from western politicians and donors for measurable progress in the Afghan state building project. In fact, in time the HFZ was accredited for reducing poppy, improving governance and having a stabilising influence on the local population. Regarding drug control, it was to argue with such dramatic reductions and there was widespread appeal to the uncomplicated logic of the intervention. The explanation of the HFZ’s success was simple: a strong governor and a credible threat that the crop would be destroyed could dissuade farmers from growing poppy, particularly when an alternative – wheat – is provided. This was a rather transactional and state centric understanding of the world that offered western policy makers the hope that results could be achieved in Helmand and other parts of Afghanistan.