A Climate Security Plan for NATO: Collective Defence for the 21st Century


Publisher: Environmental Affairs

Author(s): Erin Sikorsky and Sherri Goodman

Date: 2021

Topics: Climate Change, Peace and Security Operations, Programming

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Since its founding in 1949, the core organising principle of NATO has remained the same: collective defence. An attack against one is an attack against all. Article 5, which articulates this principle, has famously only been invoked once, in the wake of 9/11. Today, however, some of the biggest security risks facing the Alliance do not come from states or organisations alone, but instead from transnational, actorless threats like climate change and pandemics. What does collective defence mean in the face of increased extreme weather events, rising temperatures, and surging sea levels? More importantly, how do these climate change effects exacerbate or contribute to other security risks facing NATO, whether the rise of geopolitics in the Arctic, political instability in the Middle East and North Africa, or the increasing need for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief within Alliance members themselves?

These questions are not completely new to NATO. In fact, NATO has long been a leader amongst global security institutions in addressing the climate-security nexus, integrating the risks posed by climate change and environmental stress into its 2010 Strategic Concept. Since Jens Stoltenberg took the helm as NATO’s Secretary General in 2014, the Alliance has accelerated its efforts to address these risks. Stoltenberg has rightly pushed for the adoption of  a NATO-wide climate security strategy, arguing that, “Climate change is one of the biggest challenges of our time. As the planet heats up, our weather becomes wilder, warmer, windier and wetter, putting communities under pressure as sources of food, fresh water and energy are threatened … It is essential that we adapt to this new reality.” To that end, in March 2021 at a NATO ministerial meeting the Alliance agreed to pursue a strategy aimed at increasing NATO’s ability to “understand, adapt and mitigate the security impact of climate change.”

The task now is to take this high-level strategic push and translate it into sustained, long-term action. Doing so will require steady leadership toward building political consensus, as well as a concrete demonstration for NATO member states that tackling the issue together will not only mitigate climate security risks but also complement action to address other threats, saving money and resources in the long run. As the economic strains from the COVID-19 pandemic endure, questions of burden-sharing within the Alliance are likely to remain contentious.Some also warn that NATO should not become an “all-purpose alliance” that loses its focus. Given these dynamics, any proposals perceived as expanding the Alliance’s core mission without justification, or as not benefiting all member states, may face opposition from some Allies.

Alas, making the case that climate change poses serious security risks relevant to NATO’s mission is not hard to do. This article begins by examining four areas of particularly acute risks: first, climate change-induced increases in demand for humanitarian assistance and disaster recovery missions (HA/DR); second, the impacts of climate change on military readiness and operations; third, how climate change effects can exacerbate state fragility; and finally, how it contributes to geopolitical competition. Given this landscape, the next section of the article discusses what a climate security plan for NATO should include. We detail concrete steps NATO should take in the areas of building climate domain awareness, prioritising climate resilient infrastructure, and leading by example towards reducing carbon emissions.