The Operation of the Chemical Weapons Convention as a Multilateral Environmental Instrument in the Mission to Remove and Destroy the Remainder of Libya's Chemical Weapons Stockpile
Publisher: IUCN Academy of Environmental Law
Author(s): Grant Dawson
Date: 2018
Topics: Governance, Weapons, Waste, and Pollution
Countries: Libya
When Libya acceded to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC or Convention) in 2004, it possessed a significant amount of Gaddafi-era chemical weapons that now were subject to declaration, storage, and destruction under the detailed provisions of the Convention. After several years of efforts by Libya, the international community, and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), the remainder in 2016 to be destroyed was approximately 500 metric tons of toxic industrial chemicals, which were precursors of chemical weapons, such as mustard gas. In late 2015, concerns about the precursors falling into the hands of non-state actors increased when ISIS struck a checkpoint about 45 miles from Ruwagha, where the facility storing the chemicals, called the ‘tank farm’, was located. Libya had also notified the Executive Council of the OPCW that there were environmental risks in connection with the chemicals being stored at the tank farm. In February 2016, Libya requested its fellow States Parties to the CWC to assist it with the transportation and destruction of its remaining chemical weapons outside of the country. In May 2016, another checkpoint, this time only one mile from the tank farm, was attacked. In mid-July, Libya informed the OPCW that it had successfully transported the remaining chemical weapons from the tank farm to the Libyan port of Misrata and requested the assistance of the OPCW and the international community in transporting the chemicals outside of Libya on an expedited basis to a specialised waste treatment facility for destruction.
On 20 July 2016, the OPCW Executive Council adopted a decision requesting the OPCW Director-General—within seven days—to assist Libya in developing a modified plan of destruction to be considered by the Council, along with recommendations for the expeditious transport, storage, and destruction of the remaining chemical weapons. On 22 July, the United Nations Security Council authorised Member States of the United Nations to acquire, control, transport, transfer, and destroy the chemical weapons in order to ensure the elimination of Libya’s chemical weapons stockpile in the soonest and safest manner. In several subsequent decisions, the OPCW Executive Council decided that the chemicals would be removed by Libya within the shortest time possible (and by no later than 8 September 2016), reviewed the destruction plan, and approved the agreement between the OPCW and the Federal Republic of Germany that governed the destruction of the chemical weapons at a specialized destruction facility (GEKA) in Münster, Germany, as well as the OCPW’s verification of the destruction.
On 27 August 2016, the remainder of Libya’s chemical weapons stockpile was removed from the country by a civil Danish merchant ship, the DFDS Ark Futura, escorted by military vessels from the United Kingdom, Denmark, and Spain. By 8 September 2016, the chemicals had been unloaded at the port of Bremen and then trans-ported to GEKA in Münster. In addition to the efforts of Libya, the United States, Denmark, the United Kingdom, and Germany, the multi-lateral operation—coordinated by the OPCW—involved logistical, diplomatic, and financial contributions from Can-ada, Italy, Malta, Finland, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Spain. In November and December 2016, the Technical Secretariat of the OPCW informed the States Parties of the Executive Council that destruction of the chemical weapons was under-way using environmentally safe technologies, under the on-site verification of OPCW inspectors. In January 2018, the OPCW announced the completion of the destruction of the remainder of Libya’s chemical weapons stockpile. Finally, the Technical Secretariat of the OPCW has reported that it is working with the European Union on a plan to implement an environmental clean-up of the Ruwagha area, where the chemical weapons were previously stored.
The aim of the present article is to analyse the unconventional application of the CWC, and applicable multilateral environmental instruments to the successful operation to disarm, in an environmentally responsible manner, the Gaddafi-era chemical weapons programme of Libya. In doing so, the interplay of these international treaties will be addressed. The thesis presented is that the CWC, which is traditionally and primarily viewed as a disarmament treaty, in fact operates in a number of contexts to oblige States Parties to protect the environment during the storage, transport, and destruction of chemical weapons. This thesis was recently tested by the Libya operation. The relevant provisions of the CWC will be explored, along with relevant portions of the Convention’s travaux préparatoires and applicable multilateral environmental instruments. Finally, some remarks are offered regarding the convergence of security, environmental law, and sustainable development during the Libya operation.