




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Considerations for Determining when to Include Natural Resources in Peace Agreements Ending Internal Armed Conflicts

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Considerations for determining when to include natural resources in peace agreements ending internal armed conflicts

Marcia A. Dawes

The post–Cold War period has seen an increase in the inclusion of natural resource issues in peace agreements ending internal armed conflicts. This increase has gone hand in hand with the development of the comprehensive peace agreement, which has expanded the realm of peace agreements ending internal armed conflicts to include socioeconomic, human rights, and humanitarian issues.¹ Recent years have also seen an increasing consensus among practitioners and academics on the role of natural resources as a cause of internal armed conflict and on the importance of implementing sound natural resource management policies in post-conflict countries to prevent conflict recurrence.²

These trends have led practitioners, the international community, and academics to argue the importance of addressing natural resource issues and the inclusion of sound natural resource management policies and reforms as early as possible, even during peace negotiations. Peace negotiations, however, are highly political, and very often greater priority is given to security and power-sharing concerns over socioeconomic and natural resource–related issues, regardless of the importance that such issues may have to medium- and long-term peace

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This chapter is based on a review of the literature, including primary sources (such as peace agreements, United Nations Security Council resolutions, and United Nations General Assembly resolutions); interviews with government officials, diplomats, and officers of the United Nations and World Bank; case studies; and the personal experience of the author in peace processes, natural resource management, and the negotiation and drafting of peace agreements.

¹ For a complete analysis of these trends, see Suhrke, Wimpelmann, and Dawes (2007).

² For further discussion on natural resources and conflict recurrence, see Christian Webersik and Marc Levy, “Reducing the Risk of Conflict Recurrence: The Relevance of Natural Resource Management,” in this book.

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sustainability. The question for the international community—and natural resource practitioners, in particular—becomes when and how peace processes and the resulting peace agreements should address natural resources. Answering this question is crucial when designing the strategies that the international community and natural resource practitioners may implement in a peace process.

This chapter argues that the incorporation of natural resource issues in a peace process and the resulting peace agreement is a function of both the feasibility of incorporating such issues in the peace process and the impact that such issues may have in the post-conflict period. Accordingly, it proposes that natural resource practitioners should consider two questions when designing strategies for addressing natural resource issues in a peace process. The first question is the feasibility of including such issues in the relevant peace process. The second question is the short- to medium-term impacts that addressing such issues in the peace process may have on post-conflict implementation of natural resource management reforms and programs.

Although the logic of this argument seems quite simple, it is important that the international community, including natural resource practitioners, answers these questions in each particular case to determine the right strategies and instruments for addressing the trade-offs being discussed in the peace process. This analysis will also help to identify and maximize the opportunities that are available during peace talks to incorporate provisions in peace agreements that will have a positive impact on the design and implementation of natural resource management reforms and programs during the post-conflict period. This chapter studies these two questions by proposing and analyzing the variables that affect the feasibility and impact of addressing natural resource issues in peace processes. By doing so, this chapter will attempt to provide practitioners and the international community with a framework for designing strategies for addressing natural resource issues in peace processes. Such a framework may also be used to evaluate the role of the international community with respect to natural resource management in a peace process.

This chapter assumes that the appropriate inclusion of natural resource issues in a peace process and the resulting peace agreement will facilitate the design and implementation of natural resource management reforms and programs in the post-conflict period. The chapter does not discuss the benefits and problems of including natural resource issues in peace agreements.³ It assumes that appropriately addressing natural resource issues in a peace process will reduce the risk of conflict recurrence during the post-conflict period. It does not, however, attempt to define what is a good program or policy for the management of any specific natural resource during the post-conflict period.

It is important to note that peace talks are only one of many post-conflict processes in which the international community and natural resource practitioners

³ For discussion of the benefits of including natural resource issues in a peace agreement, see Dawes (2008).

can address natural resource issues. Others include post-conflict needs assessments (PCNAs),⁴ poverty reduction strategy papers (PRSPs),⁵ and post-conflict constitutional processes. Therefore, it is important for the international community, including natural resource practitioners, to strategically explore—for each individual situation—which post-conflict processes will maximize the impact of addressing natural resource issues in the post-conflict period, as well as how such processes will interact with the relevant peace agreement.

Although any type of peace agreement may address natural resource issues, this chapter considers only peace agreements that end internal armed conflicts—in particular, comprehensive peace agreements. Comprehensive peace agreements have been developed since the end of the Cold War as a response to the need to address issues other than security and power sharing in a peace process to achieve sustainable, long-lasting peace following internal armed conflicts (Suhrke, Wimpelmann, and Dawes 2007). It is in this context that the international community and natural resource practitioners began to ask themselves whether addressing natural resource issues in a peace process and the resulting peace agreement would also help in the achievement of sustainable, long-lasting peace by facilitating the implementation of natural resource management programs and reforms. Peace agreements that end interstate conflicts can and often do include natural resource issues, but their purpose is to end a conflict involving two or more countries, so emphasis is not placed on achieving peace through the implementation of institutional reforms.

The first part of this chapter proposes and analyzes the variables that affect the feasibility of including natural resource issues in a peace process. The second part proposes and analyzes the factors that determine the impact of including natural resource issues in a peace process. The third part analyzes instruments available to the international community and natural resource practitioners during the peace talks. The fourth part proposes and briefly analyzes five hypothetical scenarios and the actions that the international community and natural resource practitioners can take in such scenarios when designing strategies for incorporating natural resource issues into a peace process. The chapter ends with brief concluding remarks.

FEASIBILITY OF INCLUDING NATURAL RESOURCE ISSUES IN A PEACE PROCESS

There is a general consensus that peace processes ending internal armed conflicts should generate sustainable and inclusive peace accords (Dawes 2008). Such agreements are the result of complex political bargaining processes wherein combatants agree to leave their arms in exchange for political gains. These

⁴ For information on PCNAs, including methodology, see UNDG (n.d.). On including natural resources in PCNAs, see Jensen (2012).

⁵ For more information on PRSPs, see World Bank (n.d.).

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bargaining processes help define the agenda of peace talks, which in turn determine the content of the resulting peace agreement.⁶ The international community, the mediators, and others involved in the process, such as civil society and peace spoilers, try to influence such bargaining processes by advocating in favor of certain outcomes or the inclusion of certain issues into the agenda of the talks. It is therefore possible, as has been the case in the past, that peace agreements signed by the parties and acknowledged by the international community do not effectively address natural resource issues, even if the ownership and management of natural resources is an essential element of the conflict that is being mediated, because such issues were not included on the agenda of the peace talks.

To analyze when and how peace processes and resulting peace agreements should address natural resources, the first question that the international community, including natural resource practitioners, needs to analyze is whether it is feasible to include provisions dealing with the management of natural resources in the peace agreement—in other words, whether the conditions are favorable for the inclusion of such issues in the agenda of the talks.⁷ Determining the likelihood that any advocacy by the international community on natural resource issues will be accepted by the parties will help determine the strategy for addressing natural resource issues during the peace process, including the level of detail that can be accepted by the parties.

The following is a nonexhaustive set of variables that affect the likelihood of favorable conditions for including natural resource issues in peace talks and the peace agreement: (1) one of the parties to the conflict including natural resource issues on its agenda, (2) at least one of the parties to the conflict excluding natural resource issues from its agenda, (3) at least one of the parties to the conflict having an economic interest in a certain natural resource, (4) a power-sharing arrangement discussed by the parties that will have direct implications for the post-conflict management of natural resources, (5) an active civil society involved in the peace process and advocating for addressing natural resource issues, (6) the security situation existing at the time of the mediation process, and (7) the humanitarian situation existing at the time of the mediation process. The first five variables relate to whether it is likely that natural resources can be added to the agenda of the talks and thus whether they may be included in the peace agreement. The last two variables affect the likelihood of including natural resource issues in a peace process by defining the time available for the parties to negotiate.

The likelihood of including a natural resource issue in the agenda of the talks and in the peace agreement is higher if the issue is already on the agenda

⁶ Most often, mediators determine that a certain issue is not to be included in the agenda of the talks if inclusion of that issue may reduce the likelihood that a party will enter into the peace agreement or may affect the timing of the peace process.

⁷ This chapter employs a broad understanding of setting the agenda of peace talks that includes formal and informal methods of defining the issues to be discussed by the parties.

of one or more of the parties. This variable is subject to factors such as the power of the party advocating inclusion vis-à-vis the other parties to the conflict, and the relative importance of the issue to the advocating party. For instance, substantial pressure from the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca, or URNG) and Guatemalan civil society, with assistance from the international community, caused the government of Guatemala to accept the inclusion of land issues in the agenda of the peace talks, which in turn resulted in the signing of detailed language dealing with land reform (Stanley and Holiday 2002).

If any of the parties excludes a natural resource issue from its agenda, it is less likely that such an issue will be included in the agenda of the talks and in the resulting peace agreement in any meaningful detail. Similarly, if one of the parties has an economic interest in a certain natural resource, the likelihood that the agenda of the talks and the peace agreement will include provisions dealing with the management of that resource is not very high. For instance, despite the important role that natural resources have played in fueling the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, it was not until 2009 that a negotiated agreement substantially incorporated natural resource issues.⁸ In Liberia, despite the fact that the exploitation of timber and diamonds had been an important source of financing for the conflict—to the point that targeted sanctions by the United Nations Security Council were in place at the time of the peace negotiations—in regard to natural resources, the Accra Peace Agreement only created a commission dealing with the review and oversight of concessions during the interim period.⁹

If the power-sharing arrangement agreed to by the parties will have direct implications on the post-conflict management of natural resources, it will be difficult for the parties to accept provisions intended to offset any negative consequences of that arrangement in the implementation period. In both Sierra Leone and Liberia, it is very unlikely that the parties involved in the mediation process would have accepted major provisions that would have limited their benefits under the power-sharing arrangement.

⁸ Article 13 of the Peace Agreement between the Government and the Congrès National Pour la Défense du Peuple (signed on March 23, 2009, in Goma, Democratic Republic of the Congo) addresses “the certification, exploitation, assessment and control of natural resources.” On the failure of prior agreements to address natural resources in any meaningful manner, see Dawes (2008).

⁹ The Accra Peace Agreement—the Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the Government of Liberia and the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) and the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL) and Political Parties, signed on August 18, 2003, in Accra, Ghana—provided for a two-year interim period that would be led by the Interim Transitional Government of Liberia and that would end with elections. In 2006, elections were held and Ellen Johnson Sirleaf won the presidency. For the text of the Accra Peace Agreement, see https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/site_media/media/accords/Liberia_CPA_2003.pdf.

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In Liberia, the parties had a strong economic incentive to agree to a transitional government that would give them control over the management of natural resources. They believed that it was their turn to take a piece of the Liberian resources, and anything that might affect that “right” would be excluded from the bargaining process (Abubakar 2006). To address the problem of mismanagement, the Accra Peace Agreement created a governance commission and a contracts commission, but both commissions had serious implementation problems throughout the post-conflict interim period (Ekeanyanwu and Ogbu 2006; Altman, Nichols, and Woods 2012).

If the peace process involves an active civil society advocating for natural resource issues to be addressed, and if there is a process whereby this input is channeled into the peace talks, the likelihood that these issues will be incorporated into a peace agreement is higher. For instance, in Darfur, reforms related to the ownership and management of land is an important issue not only for the parties involved in peace talks, mainly the armed groups, but also for Darfur civil society. The Doha round of the Darfur peace process had several civil society meetings that included the parties, and resulted in outcome declarations that addressed land management reforms in a detailed manner.¹⁰

The security and humanitarian situation can put time constraints on the peace talks, thus limiting the set of issues that the parties, the mediators, and the international community can introduce into the agenda of talks to those required to end the armed conflict. This may cause the exclusion of natural resource issues if they are not a high priority of the parties. Time constraints on the mediation process also indirectly define the mediation agenda. The more time the parties have to negotiate, the higher the chance that the outcome will reflect a more in-depth analysis of the issues. Having more time to negotiate also gives other actors in the process time to advocate for the inclusion of additional issues in the agenda of the talks.

The existence of a pressing security and humanitarian situation may also be a sign that the conflict is not ready to be mediated because none of the parties yet has an incentive to enter into a peaceful settlement of the conflict.¹¹ Often, the existence of a pressing security situation is a sign that there is also a humanitarian emergency, but sometimes the two circumstances are not directly related. The critical humanitarian and security situation in Liberia was an influential element throughout the peace process and was one of the reasons for the absence of major provisions addressing governance, economic, and natural resource issues.¹² The urgency of the situation not only led the parties to the talks, it also

¹⁰ The author was involved in many of these meetings as a member of the African Union/United Nations Joint Mediation Support Team for Darfur.

¹¹ This chapter does not discuss the question of whether the international community should mediate internal armed conflicts that are not yet ripe for mediation.

¹² The mediation team thought that there was not enough time for the parties to have a discussion on governance and economic issues (including those related to natural resources) that would lead to a successful agreement (Ekeanyanwu and Ogbu 2006).

led the international community to put pressure on the parties to achieve an agreement to end the fighting.

THE IMPACT OF INCLUDING NATURAL RESOURCES IN PEACE PROCESSES

The impact of including natural resource provisions in a peace agreement ending an internal armed conflict is a function of how favorable the post-conflict conditions will be for the design and implementation of natural resource management reforms and programs. The more favorable the conditions for such reforms, the less likely it is that the peace agreement will need to address such issues. Because not all issues can be included in the agenda of the peace talks and subsequent peace agreement, it is important for the international community and natural resource practitioners to analyze the impact of including or excluding natural resource issues when they are determining their strategies with respect to the peace talks, including those related to the level of detail of provisions addressing post-conflict management of natural resources.

The following set of variables affects the likelihood of having conditions favorable to the design and implementation of natural resource management reforms and programs in the post-conflict period: (1) the nature of the state at the end of the armed conflict, (2) the existence of major natural resource issues, (3) whether the underlying economic and governance issues of the conflict have been addressed in the negotiated settlement, (4) whether there is a political settlement that will have an impact on the design and implementation of socioeconomic and governance policies and programs, (5) the existence of economic or governance spoilers,¹³ and (6) whether there is a record of failure to implement socioeconomic, governance, and natural resource reforms and programs (Dawes 2008).

After the end of an intrastate conflict, almost all countries have some level of fragility, the degree of which varies considerably. This fragility directly affects a country's capacity to design and implement policies and programs for a successful post-conflict recovery. The level of fragility may also affect a state's ability to interact with international and regional development agencies in the process of designing and implementing strategies and programs (World Bank 2002).

The more fragile a state is at the end of an armed conflict, the higher the chances that the post-conflict situation will not be favorable for the design and implementation of natural resource management reforms and programs. For instance, although some analysts considered post-conflict Guatemala a dysfunctional state (Jonas 2000), it was in most respects a moderately strong state with a functioning government that was capable of exercising most of its functions, including implementing the obligations contained in the Agreement on Social

¹³ An economic spoiler is an internal or international actor in the post-conflict society who has an incentive to exercise power to halt or slow the implementation of institutional reforms dealing with natural resources and other economic issues during the post-conflict period.

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and Economic Aspects and Agrarian Situation.¹⁴ In contrast, the Liberian state had mostly collapsed after years of uninterrupted civil war and mismanagement of its fiscal and natural resources (Dawes 2008; Dwan and Bailey 2006). Not only did the Liberian government have limited administrative control over its territory, it lacked the capacity and the necessary public administration to deliver services to its population, including the ability to pay civil servants.

Dependence on the export of primary commodities is often a cause of the conflict; such exports can fuel conflict by providing financing to rebel groups and corrupted governments, as has been the case in many conflicts (Ballentine and Sherman 2003; Pugh and Cooper 2003; Ballentine and Nitzschke 2005). The presence of substantial natural resources in a post-conflict country not only increases the risk of a return to armed conflict, but also makes the implementation of policies and programs for the management of primary commodities more difficult because it provides the post-conflict government with a strong incentive for corruption and mismanagement, which in turn affects the post-conflict recovery (Collier et al. 2003; Collier, Hoeffler, and Söderbom 2006).

The underlying issues causing an internal conflict are not always addressed during peace negotiations. Often they are not even part of the agenda of the parties. If these issues involve governance, natural resources, or economics, there is a high probability that they will resurface during the post-conflict period and affect the design and implementation of related reforms and programs.

In the case of Liberia, for example, although the levels of corruption and mismanagement by the Charles Taylor administration had been an issue during the civil war, the mediators and the parties to the conflict agreed to postpone the discussion on governance and natural resources until the newly elected government was in place (Abubakar 2006). Such issues resurfaced soon after the National Transitional Government of Liberia (NTGL) assumed power, and materially affected economic recovery and the implementation of governance and natural resource reforms and programs during the transitional period. The levels of corruption in the NTGL and the lack of support for natural resource reforms in areas such as diamond mining and timber harvesting led to the continuance of sanctions by the United Nations Security Council. It also led to the implementation of the Governance and Economic Management Assistance Program (GEMAP) in Liberia—a joint initiative of the government of Liberia and the international community to promote fiscal accountability and transparency (Dwan and Bailey 2006).

Almost all internal armed conflicts end with the establishment of a power-sharing arrangement. No post-conflict political governance structure is neutral with respect to the design and implementation of socioeconomic, governance,

¹⁴ Agreement on Social and Economic Aspects and Agrarian Situation Concluded on 6 May 1996 between the Presidential Peace Commission of the Government of Guatemala and the Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca. For text of the agreement, see www.incore.ulst.ac.uk/services/cds/agreements/pdf/guat6.pdf.

and natural resource reforms and programs during the post-conflict period, and the design of the post-conflict political arrangement may increase the fragility of the state by crystallizing existing problems.

In Sierra Leone, the Lomé Peace Agreement gave the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) control of the diamond industry by incorporating its rebel leader Foday Sankoh into the transitional government as vice president and appointing him as the chairman of the Commission for the Management of Strategic Resources, National Reconstruction and Development (Suhrke, Wimpelmann, and Dawes 2007).¹⁵ In practice, the peace agreement created a governance structure that provided no incentive for implementation of the natural resource and governance reforms required to address the objective of economic development and long-term peace. It was not until the transitional government had fallen, security had stabilized through military action from the United Kingdom and Guinea, and the Abuja Ceasefire Agreement had been signed (in November 2000) that implementation began on an international, donor-led reform agenda targeting governance and public administration (Suhrke, Wimpelmann, and Dawes 2007; Kawamoto 2012).

The presence of economic and governance spoilers during the post-conflict period may considerably affect the design and implementation of reforms and programs for natural resource management. These actors do not necessarily need to be a party to the peace agreement. In contrast, a strong pro-reform party can have a positive impact on implementation conditions, as was the case with the Mozambique Liberation Front (Frente de Libertação Moçambique, or FRELIMO). International and regional development organizations worked with FRELIMO throughout the civil war and during the implementation period, even though there was no reference to governance, natural resource, or economic provisions in the peace agreement (Suhrke, Wimpelmann, and Dawes 2007; Dawes 2008).¹⁶

The influence of peace spoilers is directly related to the relative strength of the international or local actor vis-à-vis other actors in a post-conflict society. The power of these spoilers may not necessarily be national; it could be territorial or sectoral, thus creating conditions not favorable for the implementation of natural resource reforms in either a local territorial unit or a particular industry or function of the state.

In the post-conflict period in Guatemala, for example, economic spoilers impeded implementation of economic, land, and institutional commitments to reform that were enshrined in the Agreement on Social and Economic Aspects and Agrarian Situation (Jonas 2000). The spoilers were mainly conservative

¹⁵ The Lomé Peace Agreement, dated June 7, 1999, is formally titled the Peace Agreement between the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone. For the text of the agreement, see www.sierra-leone.org/lomeaccord.html.

¹⁶ General Peace Agreement for Mozambique, signed on October 4, 1992. For the text of the agreement, see www.peaceau.org/uploads/mozambique-peace-agreement-1992.pdf.

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sectors of Guatemalan society represented by the Coordinating Committee of Agricultural, Commercial, Industrial, and Financial Associations. They had opposed the inclusion of economic issues in the peace agenda throughout the peace process. It was only pressure from the international community through provision of incentives, such as potential participation in the Dominican Republic–Central American Free Trade Agreement,¹⁷ that resulted in the eventual participation of the group in the negotiation of economic and land issues (World Bank 2002). The interest of the spoilers in maintaining the socioeconomic status quo did not end with the signing of the peace agreements. The spoilers' substantial direct and indirect control over the legislature limited the ability of the government to pass meaningful laws that would achieve the first steps of the modernization plan agreed to in the peace accord (Jonas 2000; Suhrke, Wimpelmann, and Dawes 2007).

A country's record of implementing socioeconomic, governance, and natural resource–related reforms and programs is not sufficient evidence to predict the level of commitment that a post-conflict government will have to designing and implementing such measures. The signing of a peace settlement often creates momentum for undertaking reforms. An insufficient record or a record of failure from the years prior to the end of the conflict, however, should signal to the international community that there is a high risk that the post-conflict government will not cooperate sufficiently in the design and implementation of economic, governance, and natural resource management reforms and programs.

Heading into Liberia's transitional period, the record of failure of most of the prior governments, including the Taylor administration, should have warned the international community that the design and implementation of institutional and natural resource management reforms and programs were going to be difficult. Despite Liberia's poor record, the international community welcomed the NTGL's declarations of commitment to institutional and natural resource reforms and failed to plan for any failures of implementation (Dwan and Bailey 2006).¹⁸ The international community, including the international development organizations, should have taken preventative action on matters of natural resource management and institutional reform early in 2004.

INSTRUMENTS FOR DESIGNING STRATEGIES TO ADDRESS NATURAL RESOURCE ISSUES IN PEACE PROCESSES

A number of instruments are available to the international community and natural resource practitioners that can increase the likelihood that the agenda of the talks

¹⁷ The Dominican Republic–Central American Free Trade Agreement was signed on August 5, 2004 by Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and the United States. For the text of the agreement, see www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/cafta-dr-dominican-republic-central-america-fta/final-text.

¹⁸ Interviews with officials from the United Nations, the United Nations Development Programme, and the World Bank.

and the resulting peace agreement will include natural resource provisions. These instruments include preparation of technical needs assessments to determine post-conflict natural resource management needs and provision of technical assistance to the mediation team and the parties.

During the implementation period, the international community and natural resource practitioners have a set of instruments as well that can facilitate the implementation of the natural resource provisions, thus increasing their impact. These instruments include aid conditionality; fiscal intervention programs, like GEMAP in Liberia; and the application of targeted sanctions for failure to implement natural resource management reforms.

Technical needs assessment during peace talks

Technical assistance and the design of strategies for addressing natural resources during a mediation process should be based on a detailed needs assessment. The impact of a natural resource-related provision in the implementation period is directly related to how it addresses a particular need. Sometimes it is not possible to include detailed provisions in a peace agreement, but in order to have targeted strategies and solutions, it is important that the international community, including natural resource practitioners, be aware of actual needs and foresee obstacles to implementation of natural resource management reforms and programs during the post-conflict period.

Technical experts deployed with the mediation team should have a basic understanding of the implementation obstacles that may exist; however, detailed analysis should not be left to such experts alone. Ideally the group that designs and implements the post-conflict needs assessment (PCNA) will discuss the needs and create a strategy for including provisions in the peace process that will address them. Thus far, the Guatemalan experience is the best example of a situation in which technical experts from international and regional development organizations employed such a level of analysis and coordination. In that case, the experts used their experience in El Salvador to foresee and address potential issues in the Guatemalan peace process and peace agreement.

Technical assistance

Providing technical assistance on natural resource issues to the parties in peace talks, to the mediation team, to international observers, and to civil society can increase the likelihood that these issues will be included during the peace talks. Technical assistance is most often provided by regional and international development agencies and other international actors, such as bilateral donors and the United Nations. The impact of such technical assistance depends on the recipient and the type of assistance as well as the length of the mediation process.

Technical assistance can be used not only to increase the likelihood that natural resource provisions will be included in the agenda of the talks and in the peace agreement, but also to ensure that any proposal discussed by the parties

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is technically sound. Technical assistance can also be used to alleviate any asymmetry of technical expertise that may exist among the parties. In addition, the provision of technical assistance can contribute to the development of a working relationship between international development organizations and the parties, facilitating the implementation of related reforms and programs during the post-conflict period. Finally, the provision of technical assistance during the peace talks gives the international community, including natural resource practitioners, space to ensure that adequate provisions (or “hooks”) are included in the peace agreement that can be used to advocate for the implementation of provisions on natural resource management.

Technical assistance to the parties during the peace talks is usually provided through capacity-building workshops and the deployment of technical experts to work with the mediators or the parties. Such workshops are a standard practice in peace processes. Indeed, they have become so common that parties to negotiations—in particular, armed movements—have come to expect them.

For instance, article 5 of the Framework Agreement to Resolve the Conflict in Darfur between the Government of Sudan and Liberation and Justice Movement provides that the Darfur mediation team will organize workshops to enable the parties to acquire the necessary technical capacity to participate in the negotiations.¹⁹ The purpose of capacity-building workshops ranges from providing the parties with a basic understanding of the technical issues to giving the parties advice on drafting provisions of the peace agreement. The workshops can also be used to explain to the parties the processes that will take place during the implementation period and to discuss their role in such processes. For instance, a technical advisor can explain the purpose, steps, and financing of PCNAs.

Capacity-building workshops on natural resource issues can also target different audiences within the parties. For example, it can be useful to provide detailed, technical information to the delegates negotiating the natural resource section of an agreement and less detailed, more basic information to the rest of the delegation in order to provide them with enough information to understand the trade-offs and other decisions that are being made by the delegates negotiating the natural resource section. Such an approach should build internal cohesion and facilitate the decision-making process of the parties.

The deployment of technical experts on a specific natural resource or of generic wealth-sharing experts to assist the mediators or the parties (or both) has also become standard practice. The purpose of deploying experts to work with the parties, and in particular the armed groups, is mainly to ensure that they have adequate technical expertise to understand the proposals that are being made, as well as to provide continued capacity building to such parties.

¹⁹ The framework agreement was signed in Doha, Qatar, on March 18, 2010. For the text of the agreement, see http://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/SD_100318_Framework%20Agreement%20to%20Resolve%20the%20Conflict%20in%20Darfur%20Between%20GOS%20LJM.pdf.

Ideally these experts develop a relationship of trust with the parties and help them to address the asymmetry of capacity that usually exists between armed groups and the government. Although armed groups usually have their own experts, who may be representatives from the diaspora or civil society, their technical expertise does not preclude the need for international expertise that can inform the group about international best practices and comparative experiences that will help them to deal with the proposals being discussed. For instance, throughout 2010 and 2011, the African Union/United Nations Joint Mediation Support Team for Darfur financed experts for Darfur's Liberation and Justice Movement on most of the technical issues being negotiated, including those related to land, oil, and gas. These experts complemented the experts from Darfuri civil society who were brought in by the Liberation and Justice Movement.

The deployment of technical experts on natural resource issues to provide advice to the mediation team is relevant for ensuring that natural resource management issues are incorporated into the agenda of the talks and the resulting peace agreement. Natural resource experts working with the mediation team not only can ensure technical accuracy of the proposals and the subsequent peace accord, they can also help to ensure that the mediation team understands the issues as well as the implications that decisions on non-natural resource topics, such as power sharing, can have for post-conflict implementation of natural resource management reforms and programs. Through these experts, the international community can ensure the implementation of a strategy that offsets any negative implications the proposals may have for other sectors and can see that adequate language or hooks are included to facilitate post-conflict peacebuilding.

Four international and regional development agencies—the International Monetary Fund, the United Nations Development Programme, the World Bank, and the Inter-American Development Bank—played an active role during the negotiation of the Guatemalan Agreement on Social and Economic Aspects and Agrarian Situation by closely monitoring the peace talks and providing technical assistance to the negotiating parties. One of the main concerns of these organizations was to ensure coordination between the peace negotiations and the negotiations on economic policies and programs that the respective organizations were conducting with the government in order to avoid implementation errors, such as the lack of necessary funding that occurred after the El Salvador peace process (Jonas 2000). Some analysts viewed the Guatemalan peace process as an opportunity to reform the economic institutions of the country, including its land management system, in order to foster economic development, thus providing a justification for the development agencies' involvement (Suhrke, Wimpelmann, and Dawes 2007).

Civil society can play an important role during the negotiation and implementation of a peace agreement. The more inclusive the peace process, the more legitimate its final settlement will be, in particular when addressing natural resource issues where societal ownership of the reform programs facilitates their implementation. By providing technical assistance on natural resource issues, the international community, including regional and international development

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organizations, can provide civil society with tools to understand the natural resource reforms that are being discussed in the peace process. Providing technical assistance to civil society can also help organizations and agencies understand their role during the implementation period, thus facilitating the implementation of the natural resource reforms included in the peace agreement.

Implementation mechanisms

The international community—including donors, international and regional development agencies, and the United Nations—plays an important role during the post-conflict implementation period by undertaking post-conflict early-recovery activities. These activities include development of PCNAs, administration of trust funds, and provision of policy advice, analysis, training, and technical assistance to the post-conflict government in its design and implementation of economic, governance, and natural resource reforms and programs. Many peace agreements also give the international community specific additional roles in the implementation period, such as in the implementation and monitoring of commissions. These commissions traditionally have been created to address peace and security issues, such as disarmament. Accords have also created such commissions for economic, wealth-sharing, and institutional issues, many of which relate to natural resources.

The participation of international and regional development agencies in implementation and monitoring may prove useful for facilitating the implementation of natural resource-related provisions in the post-conflict period. It may also put pressure on the post-conflict government to implement policies and programs addressing socioeconomic, natural resource, and governance issues. Ideally monitoring commissions would have a mandate that addresses economic, wealth-sharing, and governance matters, and would have enforcement powers and a high-level membership from the post-conflict government. If membership in an implementation commission is not possible, the international community, especially donors and international and regional governmental agencies, can coordinate their actions with the implementation commissions to ensure that natural resource issues are addressed.

The implementation of the Guatemalan socioeconomic agreement suffered many obstacles, including the URNG's lack of political strength and the unwillingness of the government to spend political capital on the design, adoption, and implementation of the necessary programs, regulations, and laws. The Follow-up Commission—created by the Agreement on the Implementation, Compliance and Verification Timetable for the Peace Agreements (signed on December 29, 1996)—was also too weak and understaffed to address the weakness of the parties to the agreements.²⁰ The absence of strong parties and institutions

²⁰ The Follow-up Commission was composed of one representative each from the government and the URNG, and one member of the Guatemalan congress. The chief of the United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala had a voice on the commission but no vote.

meant that many of the most important aspects of the agreements were renegotiated in Guatemala’s congress. If the international community had more actively participated in the Follow-up Commission, it might have been able to facilitate the implementation of natural resource provisions, such as those relating to land reform.

FIVE HYPOTHETICAL SCENARIOS

The following five hypothetical scenarios shed light on when countries could include natural resource provisions in their peace agreements and what strategies could be undertaken by the international community to maximize the impact of such provisions. These scenarios are based on both the feasibility and impact variables discussed previously. They do not necessarily reflect specific country situations, although they may resemble actual situations. The scenarios are over-simplifications and are not intended to replace the analysis of any particular country’s situation; rather, they provide a framework for analysis. This approach underscores the importance of undertaking needs assessments during the peace talks to develop a strategy for each particular case. See table 1 for a summary of the scenarios.

Table 1. Summary of five hypothetical scenarios for inclusion of natural resource issues in peace processes

<i>Scenario</i>	<i>Feasibility of including natural resource provisions in peace agreement</i>	<i>Feasibility of implementing natural resource management reforms and programs during post-conflict period</i>	<i>Should peace agreement include natural resource provisions?</i>	<i>Instruments and strategies available to international community during peace talks</i>
1	Unfavorable	Very favorable	No	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Technical assistance • Coordination
2	Very favorable	Very favorable	Yes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Technical assistance • Coordination
3	Favorable	Unfavorable	Yes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Technical assistance • Coordination • Advocacy for inclusion of natural resource provisions
4	Favorable	Very unfavorable	Yes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Technical assistance • Coordination • Advocacy for inclusion of natural resource provisions
5	Very unfavorable	Very unfavorable	Yes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Technical assistance • Coordination • Advocacy for inclusion of natural resource provisions

Scenario 1

In the first scenario, none of the parties has included natural resource issues in its agenda, but none has a specific objection to including such issues in the talks.²¹ Also, none of the parties has an economic incentive to include in the agreement a post-conflict governance structure that may have a negative impact on the post-conflict design and implementation of natural resource reforms and programs. Further, the security and humanitarian situation during the peace talks is moderate, causing no major time constraints for the parties and the mediation team to discuss issues other than those essential to the achievement of a negotiated settlement. This scenario is unfavorable for the inclusion of natural resource issues in the peace agreement.

This scenario, however, has very favorable conditions for the design and implementation of natural resource reforms and programs during the post-conflict period. The nature of the state is mostly strong, with a functioning government capable of designing and implementing natural resource reforms and programs during the post-conflict period. The government also has a good record of partnership with regional and international development agencies. The peace settlement provides for continuation of the pre-conflict government with minimal power sharing, so there are no major elements in the post-conflict power-sharing arrangement that may have a negative effect on the design and implementation of natural resource reforms and programs during the post-conflict period. Also, there are no economic spoilers who have an incentive to block major post-conflict reforms, or if there are spoilers, they lack sufficient political power to effectively undermine natural resource programs.

This scenario does not require including natural resource provisions in the peace agreement because neither the parties nor the mediators think that these issues should be addressed in the talks; nor do the international and regional development organizations require special authority from the peace agreement to work with the post-conflict government on the design and implementation of natural resource reforms and programs. During the peace talks, the international community, through regional and international development organizations or wealth-sharing and natural resource experts embedded in the mediation team, could provide technical assistance on natural resource issues by explaining to the parties and the mediators the different processes and instruments that are common in the post-conflict period and by discussing the implications of these for natural resource management, but there is no need to advocate for the inclusion of natural resource-related provisions in the accord.

²¹ The conclusion that neither of the parties has an incentive to include a natural resource issue in the mediation agenda assumes that the parties have received sufficient technical advice on natural resource issues to determine whether such an incentive exists. This underscores the importance of technical advice.

Scenario 2

In the second scenario, the situation is very favorable for including natural resource issues in the peace accord. At least one of the parties includes natural resource issues in its agenda. For instance, the parties have agreed to address land reform in the peace process. None of the parties has expressly excluded such issues from the talks. Also, none of the parties has an economic incentive to advocate for including in the peace accord a post-conflict governance structure that may have a negative impact on the design and implementation of natural resource reforms and programs. Finally, the security and humanitarian situation during the peace talks is moderate, so there are no major time constraints preventing the parties and the mediation team from discussing issues other than those that are essential to the achievement of a comprehensive negotiated settlement.

This scenario is also very favorable for the design and implementation of natural resource reforms and programs during the post-conflict period. The state is generally strong, with a functioning government that is capable of designing and implementing natural resource reforms and programs, and that also has a good record of partnership with international and regional development agencies. There are either no economic spoilers that have the incentive to block any major post-conflict reforms, or if present, such spoilers lack sufficient political power to effectively undermine the economic reform programs or natural resource efforts that will require special attention during the post-conflict period. Lastly, the negotiated political settlement will be favorable toward the design and implementation of such efforts; the outcome most likely will be continuance of the present government with some form of national unity governance structure.

Because in this scenario the conditions are so favorable for the inclusion of natural resource issues in the peace talks, the peace agreement should include natural resource-related provisions. During the mediation process the international community, through regional and international development organizations or through wealth-sharing and natural resource experts embedded in the mediation team, should provide technical assistance to the parties and the mediators: experts should draft and review agreements to ensure technical accuracy; explain to the parties and mediators the different processes and instruments that are common in the post-conflict period; and explain to the parties the economic, technical, and institutional implications of their choices for the implementation period. If there is a party to the conflict that will have a substantive role in designing and implementing socioeconomic, governance, or natural resource reforms and programs during the post-conflict period and does not have major previous experience working with these issues or with international and regional development agencies, the agencies should provide capacity-building assistance to facilitate the party's understanding of the issues as well as to create a basis for a future relationship.

Scenario 3

The third scenario is also favorable for the inclusion of natural resource issues in the peace accord. As in the second scenario, at least one of the parties includes natural resource issues in its agenda. For instance, the parties have agreed to address land reform issues during the talks. None of the parties has expressly excluded such issues from the talks. Also, none of the parties has an economic incentive to advocate for a post-conflict governance structure that may have a negative impact on the design and implementation of natural resource reforms and programs. Further, the security and humanitarian situation during the peace talks is moderate, causing no major time constraints that would prevent the parties and the mediators from discussing issues other than those that are essential to the achievement of a comprehensive negotiated settlement. This scenario is very similar to the second scenario with respect to the feasibility variable.

Unlike the second scenario, this scenario is not favorable for designing and implementing natural resource reforms and programs during the post-conflict period. Although the state is generally strong, with a functioning government that has the capacity to design and implement socioeconomic, governance, and natural resource reforms and programs in the post-conflict period, it does not have a good record of partnership with international and regional development agencies. Although the political settlement arising from the peace agreement is favorable for designing and implementing such measures—for instance, due to the continuance during the post-conflict period of the pre-conflict government—there are economic spoilers who have an incentive to block any major post-conflict reforms that may be included in the peace agreement or designed by the post-conflict government.

The peace agreement in this scenario will likely include natural resource provisions because there is a very favorable environment for the inclusion of such provisions, and their inclusion is necessary because of the unfavorable environment for post-conflict design and implementation of natural resource reforms and programs, in particular of the provisions that are included in the accords. In this scenario the international community should advocate for the inclusion in the peace accords of an implementation commission. Such a commission should have a wealth-sharing and governance mandate; effective enforcement powers; and a membership that includes major donors and international or regional development organizations, in addition to the post-conflict government or parties to the conflict.²²

During the peace negotiations, the international community should provide technical assistance to the parties and the mediation team. Such technical

²² Membership on the part of the government or the parties would depend on what type of power-sharing arrangement is included in the peace process. For instance, if it is a territorial power-sharing arrangement, representation of all parties to the conflict would seem advisable. On the other hand, if it is a functional power-sharing arrangement, membership of all parties to the conflict would depend on the representational structure of the government.

assistance should be similar to that provided in the second scenario, with the proviso that wealth-sharing and natural resource experts should take special care to ensure that the parties understand the implementation problems they may face. Also, capacity-building assistance should be provided to any parties that will have a substantive role in designing and implementing natural resource reforms and programs during the post-conflict period and that do not have significant previous experience working with these issues or with donors and international and regional development organizations.

Because the presence of spoilers makes the conditions unfavorable for post-conflict design and implementation of natural resource reforms and programs, especially those included in the accords, very early in the post-conflict period the international community should put pressure on the post-conflict government or on the spoilers (if they are different from the government) to implement the natural resource provisions included in the peace agreement and the programs and policies agreed to during the development of the PCNA. In addition, donors and international and regional development organizations should set conditions on aid early in the implementation process.

Because the nature of the state is strong in this scenario, and the state has the capacity to implement economic, governance, and natural resource programs and reforms, the best option for the international community may be to condition the disbursement of aid on successful implementation of post-conflict milestones or benchmarks. Coordination among donors, international and regional development organizations, the United Nations, and interested countries is essential during both the peace talks and the post-conflict period to increase the effectiveness of their actions.

This scenario resembles the Guatemalan peace process. The environment during those peace negotiations was favorable for including natural resource-related provisions in the peace accord but unfavorable for implementing the socioeconomic agreement and economic, land management, and institutional reforms. The URNG and local civil society were advocating for an agenda of economic, social, and land reforms to be included in the peace process. Although such an agenda was opposed by the government and conservative sectors from Guatemalan society, international pressure led the parties to sign the Agreement on Social and Economic Aspects and Agrarian Situation, which exclusively addressed socioeconomic, land, and fiscal issues (Jonas 2000).

Agreement on this agenda was helped by the low levels of violence in the country since the late 1980s. In addition, the international community and regional and international development organizations had played an important role by providing technical assistance to the parties and the mediation team. However, the implementation of major economic, land, and social reforms still lagged a decade after the end of the peace process, even though Guatemala was a somewhat strong state with which international development organizations could interact, and even though it had the capacity to implement the socioeconomic, land, and institution-building policies agreed to in the peace process.

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Although the Guatemalan government signed the socioeconomic agreement, it and the conservative sectors of Guatemalan society acted as spoilers and blocked the actions required for implementation, and the URNG was too weak to enforce the agreements. The weakness of the URNG and civil society and the lack of political will of the government and congress required a strong and coordinated commitment by the international community, but the international community failed to put pressure on the government and to act in a coordinated manner with respect to both aid conditionality and advocacy for implementation. The presence of international and regional development agencies in Guatemala before, during, and after the signing of the peace agreements was not enough. Strong international political will was required to maintain the momentum toward socioeconomic transformation and the modernization of the Guatemalan state as called for in the socioeconomic agreement.

Scenario 4

The fourth scenario is favorable for the inclusion of natural resource issues in a peace agreement. At least one of the parties has included natural resource issues in its agenda, and none of the other parties has expressly excluded such issues from the talks. Also, most of the parties have an economic incentive for including in the agreement a post-conflict governance structure that may have a negative impact on the post-conflict design and implementation of natural resource reforms and programs. However, the security and humanitarian situation during the peace talks is critical, causing major time constraints for the discussion of issues other than those that are essential to achievement of a comprehensive negotiated settlement, as well as for international actors who are providing technical assistance in the talks.

This scenario is very unfavorable for designing and implementing natural resource management reforms and programs during the post-conflict period. The nature of the state is generally weak, with a government that lacks the capacity to exercise most of its functions, including that of designing and implementing natural resource reforms and programs. The weak capacity means that the country has a bad record of partnership with regional and international development agencies. Also, the political settlement arising from the peace agreement will affect the capacity of the transitional government to design and implement natural resource measures, because, for example, the government that it created is a new entity that lacks such capacity. Lastly, there are economic spoilers who have incentives to block major post-conflict economic reforms, including substantial natural resource–related programs that will require special attention during the post-conflict period.

Although in this scenario there are favorable conditions for including natural resource–related provisions in the peace accords, the international community will not have sufficient time to include detailed provisions in the accords because the mediators will be under pressure to reach a final agreement in order to stop

the violence and its humanitarian consequences. The challenges will be exacerbated because some of the parties to the conflict have an incentive to oppose any provisions that would limit their economic gains from natural resources during the post-conflict period. In other words, detailed and intrusive anticorruption and natural resource management provisions will be opposed by parties that stand to benefit from the structure of a post-conflict settlement that is not conducive to post-conflict design and implementation of natural resource reforms and programs. In addition, the time constraints due to the security and military situation will limit the ability of the international community to put pressure on the parties during the peace talks through, for instance, aid conditionality.

In this scenario, the international community, through regional and international development organizations or wealth-sharing and natural resource experts embedded in the mediation team, should give technical assistance to the parties and the mediators during the peace talks by reviewing drafts and providing technical language for natural resource-related provisions to ensure the soundness of their content. Also, such actors should explain to the parties and mediators the different processes and instruments that are common in the post-conflict period. Capacity-building assistance should be provided to any party that will have a substantial role in designing and implementing natural resource-related reforms and programs during the post-conflict period but that does not have substantial experience working with these issues or with donors and international and regional development organizations. In addition, the international community should advocate for inclusion in the accords of a commission on wealth sharing, natural resources, and governance that will have enforcement powers and membership from both the international community and the post-conflict government. The international community should also advocate for the inclusion of language addressing economic governance and natural resource issues that may serve as a hook for implementation. Coordination among members of the international community is essential during the peace talks to provide a coherent message to the parties.

Scenario 5

The fifth scenario is very unfavorable for including natural resource issues in the peace accord. None of the parties includes a natural resource issue in its agenda for the talks, and at least one of the parties has expressly excluded such an issue from its agenda. Also, some of the parties have an economic incentive to advocate for including in the accord a post-conflict governance structure that may have a negative impact on the post-conflict design and implementation of natural resource reforms and programs. Further, the security and humanitarian situation during the peace talks is very difficult, imposing significant time constraints that make it difficult for the parties and the mediation team to discuss issues other than those that are essential to the achievement of a comprehensive negotiated settlement.

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This scenario is also very unfavorable for designing and implementing natural resource reforms and programs during the post-conflict period. The nature of the state is very weak, with a transitional government that will require substantial assistance from the international community to be able to design and implement natural resource reforms and programs in the post-conflict period, mainly due to its lack of capacity but also because previous governments were unable or unwilling to implement such policies. Also, the political settlement arising from the peace agreement may have a negative impact on the design and implementation of such measures. The transitional government may well include members who have no incentive to design and implement good-governance and natural resource management reforms and programs. Further, there are several economic spoilers who have an incentive to block major post-conflict reforms, particularly since management of natural resources was an aspect of the conflict that was not addressed in the negotiated settlement.

This very difficult scenario for implementing natural resource reforms and programs provides an incentive for the international community to advocate for the incorporation of very detailed and intrusive natural resource provisions in the peace accord. However, the unfavorable conditions for including such issues in the accord will make this goal very difficult to achieve. The best option for the international community during the peace talks is to provide assistance to the parties and the mediators regarding the technical aspects of natural resource reform, to educate them about the consequences of various provisions for post-conflict recovery, and to provide them with an explanation of the different processes and instruments that are common in the post-conflict period. In addition, the international community could review drafts of the agreements and provide technical language for other noneconomic and governance issues.

Although the feasibility of including natural resource provisions in the accord is not very high, the international community should advocate with the parties and the mediators for incorporating into the accord, at a minimum, vague language that will provide the international community with a foundation for pushing the post-conflict government to implement natural resource policies and programs. A commission that does not have effective enforcement capacity would not be a useful option for the international community to advocate. On the other hand, a high-level wealth-sharing and natural resource commission with enforcement powers and with representation from both the international community and the post-conflict government would be a useful option, although successfully advocating for it would be difficult due to the atmosphere at the peace talks. Coordination among the different members of the international community in the mediation phase is essential if there is to be coherence in their message. Because this implementation scenario is very similar to the one existing in the fourth case, the actions that the international community should take in this case are the same as in the fourth scenario.

In some aspects, the Liberian peace process resembles this scenario. Although the atmosphere was favorable for including natural resource provisions in the

peace talks, it was unfavorable for addressing the natural resource management issues to which the international community wanted the parties to agree. It was not possible to include a detailed and comprehensive set of provisions addressing management of fiscal and natural resource issues, let alone an implementation commission with strong enforcement powers and a substantial role for the international community.

The security situation placed substantial pressure on the international community and the parties to conclude an agreement that would stop the violence and prevent a greater humanitarian disaster, which in turn limited the time and space for the international community to put pressure on the parties to include detailed provisions addressing Liberia's grave governance and socioeconomic situation. In addition, none of the major parties—Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy, the Movement for Democracy in Liberia, nor the Taylor administration—had governance, natural resource, or socioeconomic issues as a priority on its agenda. Instead, there were incentives to continue the status quo of general corruption and misappropriation of fiscal and natural resources, which in turn made it difficult to have a transitional government other than the NTGL. Ideally, the inclusion of an implementation commission with strong enforcement powers and a membership that included the international community would have facilitated implementation of the results of the PCNA (NTGL, United Nations, and World Bank 2004; UNDG and World Bank 2007), as well as other post-conflict governance, natural resource management, and socioeconomic strategies.

The context for implementing natural resource reforms and programs during the post-conflict period was very unfavorable in Liberia. The structure and composition of the NTGL favored the maintenance of the status quo of corruption and general fiscal and natural resource mismanagement. Also, there was a bad record of implementing economic reforms and a poor working relationship with international development organizations such as the World Bank. Still, the international community took a strong and coordinated position against the NTGL on socioeconomic, natural resource, and governance issues. The continuance of the United Nations sanctions regime on diamond and timber exports and the implementation of GEMAP in September 2005 are manifestations of the international community's will to intervene in these matters.

CONCLUSIONS

The inclusion of natural resource provisions in a peace agreement and the role of the international community depend on the favorability of an environment for including such provisions in a peace process and implementing natural resource management reforms and programs in the post-conflict period. In nearly every case, there is a substantial need for the international community to place pressure on the negotiating parties to accept the inclusion of natural resource-related provisions in the peace settlement. The only exception is when the environment is unfavorable for the inclusion of natural resource issues in the peace agreement

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but favorable for the implementation of natural resource reforms and programs in the post-conflict period. This situation is reflected in the first scenario. In the other four other scenarios, the peace agreements should include natural resource provisions. However, the level of detail of these provisions and the role of the international community during both the peace talks and the implementation period will vary.

The second through fifth scenarios make clear that the more favorable the conditions are for including natural resource provisions in the peace agreement and the less favorable it is for implementation of natural resource reforms and programs in the post-conflict period, the more important it is for the international community to advocate that the parties include detailed natural resource provisions in the peace agreement. Moreover, the more difficult the post-conflict implementation period is expected to be, the more important it is that the international community deploy all available instruments in a coordinated manner to advocate for the implementation of such reforms. Detailed provisions may provide the international community with tools for advocating for the implementation of natural resource–related provisions and reforms in the post-conflict period; these tools can be employed along with other instruments, such as aid conditionality and targeted sanctions.

Following the same logic, when there is a context that disfavors both the inclusion of natural resource provisions in the accord and the implementation of natural resource reforms in the post-conflict period, as in the fifth scenario, it will be difficult for the international community to advocate for detailed provisions to be included in the accord. Provisions that are general or that set up soft principles, however, may serve as hooks for the international community to press the post-conflict government to implement natural resource reforms. In addition, economic and wealth-sharing implementation commissions that have enforcement powers and membership from both the government and the international community may prove to have a positive impact in the post-conflict period.

Technical assistance during the peace talks is a useful instrument of the international community. Assistance may be provided through regional and international development organizations or natural resource and wealth-sharing experts who are embedded in the mediation team. The international community should provide technical assistance during the peace talks in all of the scenarios except the first. In the first scenario, technical assistance is not necessary because the international community has other channels distinct from the peace negotiations for interacting with the parties, in particular with the entity that will have responsibility for designing and implementing socioeconomic, governance, and natural resource reforms and programs in the post-conflict period.

Technical assistance mainly consists of explaining natural resource issues relevant for the peace talks and for post-conflict economic recovery, as well as reviewing drafts of the accord to ensure the viability of its provisions and of the institutions created by the accord. Technical assistance becomes particularly important when natural resource provisions in the accord will have a substantive impact on post-conflict implementation. Needs assessments undertaken during

the peace talks can help the parties to better evaluate post-conflict needs and to design a strategy accordingly during the peace process.

PCNAs and their corresponding transitional results frameworks are inclusive processes that may serve as better tools for addressing natural resource needs and strategies during the post-conflict period. Therefore, when determining how detailed the natural resource-related provisions in the peace agreement should be, analysts should consider how such provisions can facilitate needs assessments, as well as how such processes may address natural resource issues that are not included in the peace agreement.

The impact of including natural resource provisions in peace accords is relatively low compared to the influence of economic instruments that the international community may use during the post-conflict period to advocate for the implementation of economic, governance, and natural resource reforms—especially if there is a high level of coordination among donors and international and regional organizations. However, together with other instruments that the international community and the parties to the conflict possess, the peace agreement may be used to achieve economic development and long-lasting peace. It is most important that the international community—through donors, international and regional development organizations, and wealth-sharing and natural resource experts embedded in the mediation team—considers all these instruments together in order to maximize the utility of each instrument when defining strategies for ending the conflict and achieving economic recovery.

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